

SECRET

25X1

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

NIO/Warning

nuclear

25X1

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC 4521-79/1
27 August 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: John Despres
National Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Report--Nuclear Proliferation (U)

1. Action Requested: None; for your information and possible comments only. (U)

2. Background: The attached report is based on discussions held during a meeting of the Interagency Intelligence Working Group on Nuclear Proliferation on 23 August 1979. (U)

John Despres
John Despres

Attachment:
NFAC 4521-79



25X1

SECRET

25X1

SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

NFAC 4521-79

Monthly Warning Report: Nuclear ProliferationPakistan-India

1. Political-military tensions between India and Pakistan could rise rapidly this autumn if President Zia is perceived by Indians to be preparing a nuclear explosion before elections take place in November. Simultaneous electoral campaigns in India and Pakistan could exacerbate tensions between them and stimulate public pressure to escalate any incidents that appear to have been provoked by the other side. [REDACTED]

25X1

2. Indian authorities are likely to assume the worst about:

--Zia's intentions to conduct a test for immediate political effect;

[REDACTED] 25X1

--the results of Pakistani efforts to acquire fissile material from abroad;

--other early indications of Pakistan's nuclear test preparations.

President Zia has probably not finally decided whether or when to test, and a test is probably infeasible this year unless fissile material has been acquired secretly from abroad. However, were a test to occur, India's immediate reactions would probably be severe. [REDACTED]

25X1

3. Indian suspicions that Pakistan may be about to demonstrate nuclear explosive capabilities are unlikely to be allayed by assurances that may be provided within the next few months. But, India's caretaker leadership would be very reluctant to order an early test of its own or to use force against Pakistani nuclear facilities unless Pakistan's test preparations were evidently complete or a first test was a fait accompli. Nevertheless, Pakistani leaders are likely to continue concentrating forces, exercising air defenses, and tightening security around key nuclear installations; and military tensions could develop along the border as well. [REDACTED]

25X1

4. An actual test this autumn would aggravate tensions further and raise new possibilities of general conflict between Pakistan and India. [REDACTED]

25X1

NOTE: This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/NP. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Page Denied

25X1
25X1

25X1

25X1